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Abstract—Data sent over the Internet can be monitored and
manipulated by intermediate entities in the data path from the
source to the destination. For unencrypted communications (and
some encrypted communications with known weaknesses), eaves-
dropping and man-in-the-middle attacks are possible. For en-
crypted communication, the identification of the communicating
endpoints is still revealed. In addition, encrypted communications
may be stored until such time as newly discovered weaknesses
in the encryption algorithm or advances in computer hardware
render them readable by attackers.
In this work, we use public data to evaluate both advertised
and observed routes through the Internet and measure the extent
to which communications between pairs of countries are exposed
to other countries. We use both physical router geolocation as
well as the country of registration of the companies owning
each router. We find a high level of information exposure; even
physically adjacent countries use routes that involve many other
countries. We also found that countries that are well ‘connected’
tend to be more exposed. Our analysis indicates that there exists
a tradeoff between robustness and information exposure in the
current Internet.
Index Terms—Measurement, Privacy, Internet
I. INTRODUCTION
Data sent over the Internet can be monitored and manip-
ulated by intermediate entities in the path from the source
to the destination. For unencrypted communications (and
some encrypted communications with known weaknesses),
eavesdropping and man-in-the-middle attacks are possible. For
encrypted communication, the identification of the communi-
cating endpoints is still revealed. This is important for certain
security sensitive communications (e.g., communication be-
tween military commands and units). In addition, encrypted
communications may be stored until such time as newly dis-
covered weaknesses in the encryption algorithm or advances
in computer hardware render them readable by attackers. This
kind of attack is especially dangerous as quantum computers,
that can break widely used public key encryption, become a
reality.
This work is an attempt to quantify this global information
exposure in the Internet by measuring the extent to which
communications between pairs of countries are exposed to
other countries. We focus on the routers relaying the packets
in Internet communications and use two publicly available
datasets to evaluate both advertised and observed routes
through the Internet.
With the first dataset, we focus on the physical geolocation
of the routers. Every router resides within a unique national
boundary and is required to operate according to the laws
of that nation. Thus, the data traversing the nation may be
exposed to government eavesdropping or control. This dataset
was essentially traceroute data from a worldwide collection
of monitors (probing sites). We determined the country of
residence of each router by geolocating it Internet Protocol (IP)
address and used that to convert the router paths to country
paths. This gives us a security model in which each router is
mapped to their country of residence. Whether or not countries
use due process and/or provide transparency for such data
access does not affect our results.
With the second dataset, we focus on the legal ownership of
the routers. Every router is part of an autonomous system (AS)
and every AS is owned by a company that has a country of reg-
istration. In this approach, we map each router to the country
in which their AS is registered. This models companies abiding
by the laws of their country of registration and providing
access to the routers that they own. This may be required
in some countries or optional in others for assets outside of
the physical boundary of the country. These distinctions are
irrelevant for our research as we are evaluating worst case data
exposure. This dataset was from BGP router tables where we
converted advertised routes to country paths through mapping
ASs to their country of registration.
Using these two datasets we performed several experiments.
In the first experiment we evaluated how well the data from
a set of monitors (BGP routing tables or traceroute prob-
ing sites) in a country ‘generalized’ to other sites in the
country. This experiment undergirds the utility of the other
measurements. We then measure the number of countries
‘involved’ in communication between pairs of countries with
respect to the distance between the paired countries. We next
randomly choose increasing sets of untrusted countries to be
‘excluded’ from communication exchanges. We saw how well
pairs of countries could avoid that their communications transit
through the excluded countries. Lastly, we perform graph
centrality analyses (closeness, degree, eigenvalue, and load)
on the graphs generated from using the country paths from
ar
X
iv
:1
90
6.
11
06
1v
1 
 [c
s.C
R]
  2
6 J
un
 20
19
both datasets.
Our generalization results showed that it is possible to use a
small number of monitoring sites within a country, x, in order
to represent the country to country network traffic of the rest
of the sites in x to a high degree of coverage.
With the ‘involved’ country experiments, the geolocation
and registration data produced very similiar results. We dis-
covered that adjacent countries (on our country communication
graph of the Internet) still have a high number of involved
countries between them (those that can view their network traf-
fic). Even more surprising, the number of involved countries
actually increases as the country graph distance decreases. In
general the number of involved countries was slightly higher
for the registration data compared to the geolocation data.
Lastly, we found that countries were extremely close together
(usually just 1 or 2 hops for most countries).
With the ‘excluded’ country experiments, the results from
the geolocation and registration data differed significantly.
We show that it is insufficient to use just the geolocation
data to determine information exposure, as has been done in
previous work. We show that for a small number of excluded
countries (e.g., less than 10), in general there is a high chance
that a country can send data to another country where all
known routes avoid the excluded countries. However, this
likelihood decreases extremely rapidly with more than 10
excluded countries.
With the country graph centrality experiments, we compute
the average number of involved countries (between a given
country to all the other possible destinations) with respect
to the centrality (closeness, degree, eigenvalue, and load) of
that country. We show that countries with high centrality
values (i.e., well connected) tend to have higher information
exposure. This has been observed with all centrality metrics
and with both datasets. This observation is consistent with
the findings of the ‘involved’ country experiments, where we
discovered that adjacent countries still have a high number
of involved countries between them. Indeed, when a country
has high (say degree) centrality, it has many direct neighbors.
Since the number of involved countries is high for each
neighbor, the average is consequently high. This seems to
suggest that in the current Internet, there is a tradeoff between
the “connectivity” of a country and its degree of information
exposure. Indeed, a country that is well connected has many
alternate paths to each destination (which is desirable for the
robustness of routing). However, the diversity of paths also im-
plies that many countries (some potentially adversarial) might
be traversed by the communications to a given destination.
We are not aware of any other study revealing this robustness-
exposure tradeoff.
II. DATA DESCRIPTION
We obtained our data from the public datasets provided by
the Center for Applied Internet Data Analysis (CAIDA) [1],
covering the years 2015 and 2016. We collected both Border
Gateway Protocol (BGP) routing tables to view advertised AS
routes through the Internet as well as traceroute type data
from a worldwide set of monitors. We converted both AS
and router paths into country paths (as described below). A
challenge is that our datasources reveal Internet paths that
are both advertised (registration data) and used (geolocation
data), however, neither dataset reveals how often these paths
are used. In addition, there likely exist additional routes not
revealed from our data sources. Our experimental results thus
are a lower bound on the extent to which information exposure
is taking place at the country level. This said, it is reasonable to
assume that our discovered routes cover the primary pathways
through the Internet.
A. Geolocated Router Path Data
Our first dataset, which we call the ‘geolocated’ data,
consisted of actual paths discovered through active scamper
probing [2] (similiar to traceroute) by a worldwide set of
CAIDA Archipelago (Ark) monitors [3]. We collected all daily
traces from January 01, 2015 to December 31, 2016 (a total
of 123 121 files totaling 2.3 TB). After pre-processing and
duplicate removal, we ended up with more than 3.1 billion
distinct probe traces for each year. We then used the Max-
Mind1 service [4] to geolocate each router within a particular
country and we converted the router paths into country paths.
While geolocation data of routers can be inaccurate, previous
work has found that it is more accurate at a country level of
abstraction [5].
B. Autonomous System Path Data
Our second dataset, which we call the ‘registration’ data,
consisted of Border Gateway Protocol (BGP) routing tables
from a worldwide set of routers. This provided advertised
routes between autonomous systems (ASs). We obtained the
data using the BGPStream tools [6] to collect data from the
University of Oregon Routeviews Project [7] from Jan 01,
2015 to Dec 31, 2016 (a total of 150 GB of raw data). After
pre-processing and duplicate removal, we ended up with more
than 2.5 billion path traces for each year. Using other CAIDA
provided data, we mapped ASs to their countries of registration
thereby converting the AS paths to country paths.
III. DATA GENERALIZATION EXPERIMENT
Both datasets yield country paths through the Internet
originating from specific locations or ‘monitors’ (a router
that provided its BGP tables or a scamper probing site).
Any particular country will have zero or more monitors. The
monitors tend to be distributed throughout a country as there is
little motivation to monitor the same location multiple times.
Thus, we assume that the monitors have somewhat of a random
distribution but acknowledge that this is not strictly true.
To undergird the results of our information exposure ex-
periments, it is necessary to show that the set of monitors
within particular countries provide sufficient data to represent
the entire country (that they ‘generalize’). More specifically,
the set of country paths yielded by the monitors should closely
1Any mention of commercial entities or products is for information only;
it does not imply recommendation or endorsement by NIST.
approximate the set of country paths that would be revealed
in the hypothetical case of having monitors in every location
within the country.
We approximately test this by comparing the paths revealed
by each monitor with the paths revealed by all other monitors
within a particular country. Let M represent the set of monitors
in a country. Let R(W ) represent the set of country paths
revealed by the monitors in set W . Let x ∈M and Y = M \x.
For each x, we compute a ratio |R({x}) ∩ R(Y )|/|R({x})|
which we refer to as the ‘generalization ratio’. We then plot
the mean of all such computed ratios for each country against
the number of monitors in that country.
For the registration data, the mean generalization ratio
increases very quickly to at least .7 with 20 monitors and
around .9 with 60 monitors. One country had 3303 monitors
and another 13 912 monitors resulting in generalization ratios
of .99. For the geolocation data, the mean generalization ratio
also increases very quickly to at around .8 with just 5 monitors.
One country had 44 monitors with a generalization ratio of
around .96. These results show that with a sufficient number
of monitors within a country, our data generalizes to represent
the country paths used by a vast majority of the countries.
IV. INFORMATION EXPOSURE EXPERIMENTS AND
ANALYSIS
All experiments were performed on both datasets (geolo-
cation and registration) for both 2015 and 2016. Due to
space constraints, we limit ourselves to summarizing our
findings from the data. Some example results are provided,
anonymizing the countries as Bespin and Hoth.
A. Number of Countries Involved in Pairwise Communication
Our first experiment is to measure how many countries are
involved in country to country Internet communications. The
set of ‘involved’ countries, I(x, y), for a pair of communicat-
ing countries x and y consists of all countries on any recorded
country path from x to y (excluding both x and y). The
involved countries represent the minimal set of countries that
could observe or modify some fraction of the communications
from x to y. Note that even with encrypted traffic, this mea-
surement matters for certain high sensitivity communications
(e.g., military commands) as the communicating endpoints are
revealed.
1) Experiment: For our experiment, we calculated I(x, y)
for all paths between all pairs of countries. We did this for
both the registration and geolocation data. We evaluated each
source country x individually, creating a figure to analyze each
country (an example is shown in figure 1). For each x we
plotted each target country y using a figure with an x-axis
representing the mean country distance among all paths and
the y-axis representing the total number of involved countries
using all paths. We then performed the same analysis but used
the minimum country distance for the x-axis.
2) Discussion: We find that the number of involved coun-
tries can be high. This is true for both datasets. One large
wealthy nation has up to 96 involved countries between it and
Fig. 1. Bespin Mean Involved Country Exposure from Geolocation data for
2016
another country. Surprisingly, we find this even for countries
that are adjacent. This indicates that even when countries have
close proximity (either geographically or logically), the routing
structure of the Internet will use many non-direct paths. While
likely necessary and appropriate for dynamic load balancing,
it has a huge effect in increasing the worst case information
exposure between countries on the Internet.
Furthermore, we find a relationship between the number
of involved countries and the distance between the countries
(i.e., number of intervening countries). The number of involved
countries generally decreases as the distance increases. This
result seems counter intuitive and has a great impact on the
evaluation of the privacy of communications between pairs of
countries.
B. Excluding Countries from Communications
In this experiment we evaluate how easily particular coun-
tries can communicate to all other countries without their
communications traversing some target set of countries.
1) Experiment: We execute 20k trials per country. We test
excluded country list sizes ranging from 0 to 190 using a step
of 10. For each size, we ran 500 trials; for each trial we choose
a random destination country and a random set of countries
to be on the excluded list for that trial. For each country we
created a figure showing the mean ratio of paths containing
no excluded countries over all paths (including data to all the
other countries in a single figure). We also plotted the ratio for
all paths containing excluded countries as well as when the
paths contained a mixture (some having excluded countries
and some not). An example figure is shown in figure 2.
2) Discussion: For all countries, as the number of countries
on the excluded list increases, the ratio of paths containing
no excluded countries decreases rapidly (a roughly geometric
or exponential decay depending upon the country). For one
wealthy large country, an excluded list of size 10 using the
geolocation data yields a 57% chance of no paths having an
excluded country (choosing some other country at random as
the destination). However, increasing the list to 20 reduces the
chance to just around 37%; at 50 it is 10%. These numbers
Fig. 2. Hoth Excluded Country Exposure from the Geolocation Data for 2016
vary dramatically given specific scenarios with set country
pairs and should not be used to evaluate the overall state of
privacy for Internet communications.
Performing the same example evaluation using the regis-
tration data changes the results to around 9%, 6%, and 2%
respectively. This shows that evaluating information exposure
using just the geolocation data is insufficient as the registration
data has significantly different result values (although the sim-
ilarly shaped functions). To our knowledge, all past research in
this area has focused solely on using the geolocation data (or
they used the router registration BGP data as a substitute for
router geolocation, which we show in section V to be flawed).
C. Comparison to Country-Country Communication Graph
We also analyzed the overall communication graphs using
centrality metrics. To our knowledge, these are novel results
as we focus on centrality measurements for the Internet as a
whole from the perspective of country to country communi-
cations.
1) Experiment: In this experiment we take the following
types of centrality metrics: closeness, degree, eigenvalue,
and load. Degree centrality indicates the number of nodes
connected to a given node. Closeness centrality measures the
mean distance from a vertex to other vertices. Eigenvalue
centrality is a measure of the structural importance of nodes,
proportional to the structural importances of their connected
neighborhood. The load centrality of a node is the fraction of
all shortest paths that pass through that node.
The experiment works as follows. First, we generate a
country-level communication graph by: (1) merging all routers
(or ASs) within a same country into one node and removing
all loops; (2) considering links between routers (or ASs) in
different countries as links between the nodes representing
the countries (all multi-edges are removed). Second, for each
country (which represents a node in the graph) and for each
centrality metric, we compute the average number of involved
countries to all possible destinations from that country. We
finally scatter-plot the average number of involved countries
as a function of the value of the centrality metrics. An example
Fig. 3. Node Closeness Centrality for 2016 Geolocation Data
result is provided in figure 3 (the rest are omitted due to space
limitations.
2) Discussion: We find that the general trend is that as the
centrality values of the nodes increase, the average number
of involved countries increases. In other terms, as a country
is more connected, its information exposure increases in the
sense that there are more countries that might be involved in a
communication between that country and a random destination
in the world.
The observations above are consistent with what we have
found with our ‘involved’ countries experiment. For recall,
we observed that adjacent countries still have a high number
of involved countries between them. As involved countries
are determined using routes discovered in the dataset, this is
equivalent to saying that even for pairs of countries between
which there is a direct communication path, there exist many
alternate and independent paths that go through at least one
other country. Hence, if a country has many neighbors (in the
communication graph), there will exist many such alternate
paths (going through third countries), and the average num-
ber of involved countries will be large. This could also be
explained by the dis-assortativity [8] property of the Internet,
which states that “nodes with high centrality metric tend to
be connected together”. A consequence of this is that those
nodes will tend to form together a very well-connected sub-
graph with many independent paths. On the other hand, as the
distance between the two countries increases, there will be
less of those independent paths, resulting to a lower average
of involved countries.
Having many independent paths is by itself a well-desired
property for the robustness of the Internet. Our study shows
that there is an unintended cost to this robustness: the exposure
of information. Since the Internet routing is based on “best
effort”, any of the alternate paths can be used for a given
communication between two countries. However, with more
alternate paths between two countries, there is a greater risk
that their communications transit via an un-trusted country,
hence increasing their information exposure. To our knowl-
edge, this paper is the first study that reports on this tradeoff
between robustness and information exposure.
V. RELATED WORK
[9] is most similar to our work in that they evaluate routes
to determine their information exposure at a country level
of abstraction. It uses traceroute and due to limitations of
their measurement infrastructure, they limit their analysis to
five countries. They focus on measurements of regular users
accessing the Alexa Top 100 websites and provide related
analytics on specific countries. In contrast, our work is focused
on information exposure measurements for the movement of
high sensitivity data of interest to foreign nation-states. Instead
of being limited to just a few countries, our approach using
publicly available datasets can be applied to all countries.
Of perhaps greater importance is that our work did not just
evaluate router geolocation dataset as in [9], it includes router
country of registration data as well.
[10] and [11] use BGP data for an analysis of nation-
state routing. However, they use BGP data to approximate
the country of residence of each router on a path. At the
AS level of granularity, the country location of the specific
routers used in a path cannot be accurately determined [9]. To
easily see this, consider the Internet backbone provider Level
3. They own routers throughout the world, on every continent,
and yet their country of registration is the United States [1].
Using the Level 3 Internet backbone, communications paths
can physically traverse the entire globe and yet appear using
the BGP data to stay within the United States. We use the
more accurate geolocated traceroute data for this purpose and
uniquely use the BGP data to show the countries that have
influence over the companies owning the routers (regardless
of their physical location). Both perspectives are important and
our work is the first to take both into account.
[12] and [13] evaluate how groups of countries could
collude to partition up the Internet into isolated chunks in order
to prevent pairs of countries from communicating. The two
papers use geolocated router paths converted to country paths
as we do but focus on using them to measure the possibility of
active attacks as opposed to measuring information exposure.
VI. CONCLUSION
We have quantified the information exposure in the global
Internet with respect to countries having access to (or even
modifying) data in transit between other countries. Our ex-
periments covered all countries and we presented here the
results for two representative countries. We have found that
the level of exposure is significant. Even for communicating
countries that are physically adjacent, many paths involving
other countries are used. Physical proximity does not guarantee
private communications. Our study has also shown that there
is an apparent tradeoff between robustness and information
exposure in the global Internet.
Our results motivate enhanced security with respect to
international communications that may be of interest to foreign
entities. We assume that strong encryption for such communi-
cations is already being implemented. Enhancements may be
made in the area of hiding the communicating endpoints for
communications in which this is relevant (e.g., communicating
intelligence centers or military commands). The use of proxies
and anonymous routing services can be assistive (although
network throughput can then suffer and such services have
had vulnerabilities). A remaining danger is that strongly
encrypted traffic will be stored and then decrypted once
quantum computers are accessible to nation states or until
used cryptographic algorithms have been broken. Our findings
on information exposure then promotes the changeover to
quantum resistant encryption.
Lastly, our work has shown that it is possible to model
the communications between countries to determine the in-
formation exposure. Our work is thus a template for how
others can perform this calculation for operational use. Using
our approach, allied countries can evaluate their Internet
communications and determine a lower bound on which other
countries have the access to eavesdrop on their traffic. If that
set of countries contains only allies, the risk of information
exposure is diminished (but not eliminated). If not, additional
security measures should be considered for highly sensitive
data.
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